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Recent studies of American politics evidence that political polarization of both
the electorate and the political elite have moved “almost in tandem for the past
half century” (McCarty et al., 2003, p.2), and that party polarization has steadily
increased since the 1970s. On the other hand, the empirical literature on party
platforms and implemented policies has consistently found an imperfect but non-
negligible correlation between electoral platforms and governmental policies: while
platforms tend to be polarized, policies are moderate or centrist. However, existing
theoretical models of political competition are not manifestly compatible with these
observations.
In this paper, we distinguish between electoral platforms and implemented poli-
cies by incorporating a non-trivial policy-setting process. It follows that voters may
care not only about the implemented policy but also about the platform they sup-
port with their vote. We ﬁnd that while parties tend to polarize their positions, the
risk of alienating their constituency prevents them from radicalizing. The analysis
evidences that the distribution of the electorate, and not only the (expected) location
of a pivotal voter, matters in determining policies. Our results are consistent with
the observation of polarized platforms and moderate policies, and the alienation and
indiﬀerence components of abstention.
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11 Introduction
In a recent study of American politics, McCarty et al. (2003) evidence that political
polarization has steadily increased since the 1970s. There is similar evidence that
the mass public is also increasingly polarized in terms of liberal-conservative views
(Green et al., 2002).1 However, it is not manifest that the existing theoretical models
of political competition are compatible with this divergency within the political
elite and the electorate. Even those models whose equilibria present diﬀerentiated
electoral platforms ﬁnd that parties are subject to a centripetal force only palliated
by bounded rationality (Kollman et al., 1992), valence issues (Ansolabehere and
Snyder, 2000; Aragon´ es and Palfrey, 2002), incumbency advantages –and “valence”
issues– (Bernhardt and Ingberman, 1985; Londregan and Romer, 1993), uncertainty
and ideology (Wittman, 1977; Calvert, 1985), or internal decision-making (Snyder,
1994).
We believe that the critical element missing from the dominant literature is
the distinction between electoral platforms and implemented policies and the fact
that the outcome of an election aﬀects the actions taken by the winners. That is,
electoral victors do not implement the platform on which they were elected but
rather temper their implement policies by their margin of victory. Supporting our
claim, the empirical literature that examines the relationship between party plat-
forms and implemented policies has consistently reported two observations. First,
while platforms tend to be polarized, policies are more moderate or centrist.2 Sec-
ondly, although electoral platforms and governmental outcomes systematically diﬀer
from each other, they are not stochastically independent.3
In this paper, we develop a model of political competition which is consistent with
these ﬁndings. We depart from the dominant literature by letting the implemented
policy diﬀer systematically from the electoral platform of the winning party. In
particular, following the spirit of the empirical observations, the implemented policy
will depend on the voting outcome and on the platforms announced by each party.
Thus, there exists a process of policy setting in which the higher the fraction of
votes obtained by a party, the closer the implemented policy is to its proposal. We
1For instance, using data from Green et al. (2002), McCarty et al. (2003) report that “the
diﬀerence between the ‘percentage of Republicans who call themselves conservatives’ and the ‘per-
centage of Democrats who call themselves conservatives’ has doubled between 1972 and 1996,
moving from 25% to 50%.” (p.3)
2Poole and Rosenthal (1984b) use thermometer scores to measure the perceived location of
candidates and policies; Fiorina (1974), Poole and Rosenthal (1984a), Poole and Daniels (1985)
use interest groups ratings; Poole and Rosenthal (1991, 1997), Snyder (1996), and Alesina and
Rosenthal (1995) discover the same pattern using roll call votes in congress.
3See Budge and Hoﬀerbert (1990, 1992), Hoﬀerbert and Klingemann (1990), Klingermann et al.
(1994), and King et al. (1993).
2do not require parties to be very sensitive to the electoral result, nor we impose any
symmetric conditions in their post-electoral behavior. Thus, our representation will
allow for “obstinate” candidates (who will implement a policy arbitrarily closed to
their proposal even with a narrow margin of victory), as well as for very “reconciling”
parties. Further, both types may co-exist in the same election.4
Modifying the policy-setting process has two important, and often overlooked,
implications on voting behavior. First, unlike the winner-takes-all case, if platforms
and implemented policies diﬀer, voting for the preferred candidate is not a dominant
strategy for all voters. Consider, for instance, a voter with moderate views who ﬁnds
the proposal of the left party (L) more appealing than that of the right party (R).
Suppose also that she expects, due to an overwhelming support for the left party,
that the implemented policy will be too far left for her. Then, she may decide to
vote for the right party in order to moderate the policy implemented by the left.
That is, we may ﬁnd ‘strategic voting’ in the sense that a voter who prefers the
alternative oﬀered by party L to the one announced by R may, nevertheless, vote
for R to moderate L’s policy.
Second, since platforms and policies do not necessarily coincide, we cannot ig-
nore that voters may consider both (the electoral platform and the eﬀect on the
implemented policy) when deciding whether to vote and for whom. For example, a
conservative voter may ﬁnd voting for an extreme-right party ‘too costly’, regardless
of the impact that a larger support for that party would have on the implemented
policy. Her reluctance would come not from the inﬂuence on ﬁnal policies, but from
the “ideology” represented by such a party. If the extreme-right party were the only
alternative to obtain a more conservative policy, we may expect this voter to feel
alienated and abstain.5
Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish two components on voting behavior. On
the one hand, insofar as voters care about the policy outcome, they vote for the
party that aﬀects the implemented policy in the direction of their interests. This
component represents the policy-oriented side of voters. On the other hand, voters
face a “cost” of supporting a platform that diﬀers from their most preferred policy.
This is the platform-oriented side of voters. Because platforms and policies do not
necessarily coincide, voters who would have supported a party from a purely policy-
oriented point of view may abstain because they strongly disagree with the party’s
platform. The ﬁnal voting decision will depend then on both the policy-oriented
and the platform-oriented sides of voters.
Our analysis incorporates the previous features and analyzes a two-party, uni-
dimensional political competition game with a dynamic structure. In period one,
parties announce their electoral platforms. In period two, citizens observe the plat-
4See Figure 2 for examples.
5See Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1989) for a similar voting behavior in a diﬀerent context.
3forms and decide whether to vote for one of the two candidates or to abstain. Their
decision is based on their preferences over policies and platforms and their expecta-
tions about the outcome of the election. Finally, after the election, a policy-setting
process takes place in which the implemented policy depends on both the parties’
platforms and their electoral support. We show that, in the absence of voting costs,
parties polarize their positions, while it is the existence of voting costs that causes
parties to moderate their platforms to avoid alienating the core of their constituency.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and introduces
the equilibrium concept. Readers interested in an overview of the main results can
look ﬁrst at the example in Section 3. The following two sections derive the formal
results. Section 4 studies the case of costless voting. In equilibrium, everybody votes
and parties radicalize their positions, yet the implemented policy is moderate and
consistently diﬀers from the median voter ideal policy. Section 5 incorporates a posi-
tive cost of voting. Parties announce diﬀerentiated yet non-extreme policies. Voters
concentrate around the announced platforms, and substantial turnout generically
obtains. Abstention occurs among voters with extreme views (those who feel alien-
ated), as well as among voters with moderate views, who are suﬃciently indiﬀerent
regarding marginal changes in the policy outcome. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
We model the electoral process as a political game between parties and voters with
a dynamic structure. Two parties, L and R, announce their campaign platforms by
choosing a location in the policy space. Citizens observe the platforms and vote for
one of the two candidates or abstain. After the election, a policy is implemented as
a function of the electoral platforms and the voting outcome.
The following sections describe the three steps in the political game: platform
announcement, voting, and policy formation. The timing of events is presented in
Figure 1. We solve the game by backward induction.





⊂ R. We will use T 2 = T × T. There are two parties, labelled L
and R. We diﬀerentiate between parties’ platforms (the policies on which parties
campaign) and the government’s policy (the policy implemented by the the electoral
victor). We will denote parties’ platforms by tL and tR.
2.1 Policy Formation
A key feature of the present model is that the implemented policy may diﬀer from
the electoral platform of the winner. Policy is assumed to be the result of a post-
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Voters vote for one




A policy is implemented as a
function of the platforms and
the electoral outcome.
Figure 1: Timing of events.
The literature on policy compromise have oﬀered several explanations for the im-
plemented policy to depend on the margin of victory. For example, Ortu˜ no-Ort´ ın
(1997) argues that “a democratic society is integrated by diﬀerent institutions and
groups. Some of them will favor the policies announced by the winning party, some
will favor the opposition’s platforms, but all may have some inﬂuence on the actions
taken by the government, and their inﬂuence will be a non-decreasing function of
the support received by the corresponding party.” Alternatively, Dixit et al. (2000)
ﬁnd tacit collusion between forward-looking parties in a plurality political environ-
ment. If we assume that the ruling party knows that its term will reach an end and
expects that the other party will be in power sometime in the future, this party
may then go to some extent towards the interests of the opposition when setting the
policy, expecting the same treatment when it itself becomes the opposition party. A
third argument considers the possibility that the opposition may decide to confront
a policy and mobilize its constituency if it feels entitled to a better outcome. If con-
frontation (social unrest) is costly for the government, this may decide to deviate
from its proposal and implement a more moderate policy (Ellman and Wantchekon,
2000)6
For the purpose of this paper, it will be convenient to abstract from the diﬀerent
stories and model policy setting in a reduce form by directly specifying a map
from platforms and voting outcomes to ﬁnal policies. In particular, we let the
implemented policy be a function of the announced platforms (tL,tR), and the voting
outcome (ν,1 − ν), where ν is the share of the vote that party L received. Let the
6Other justiﬁcations can be found in Austen-Smith and Banks (1998); Alesina and Rosenthal
(1995, 1996, 2000); Gerber and Ortu˜ no-Ort´ ın (1998); Grossman and Helpman (1996); De Sinopoli
and Iannantuoni (2003).
5weight function g : [0,1] → [0,1] such that g(ν) represents the weight of party
L’s proposal in the implemented policy. Then we deﬁne the implemented policy
function.7
Deﬁnition 2.1 Let tL and tR be the platforms announced by party L and party
R, respectively. Let ν be the share of the vote cast for L. Then we deﬁne the
implemented policy function ˆ t : T 2 × [0,1] → T as
ˆ t(tL,tR,ν) = g(ν) tL + (1 − g(ν)) tR. (2.1)
The following assumption describes the only conditions imposed on g.
Assumption 1 (A1) a) g ∈ C1;
b) g(0) = 0, g(1) = 1;
c) g0(ν) > 0, ∀ν ∈ (0,1).
Part (b) implies that if one of the parties obtains all the votes, it implements its
announced platform. By (c), the larger the share of the vote a party obtains, the
stronger its inﬂuence in the ﬁnal policy. Finally, part (a) introduces continuity:
small perturbations in the voting outcome cannot produce large changes in the
implemented policy.
Assumption 1 is common in this literature and allows for an implemented policy
function ˆ t general enough to represent a wide variety of scenarios. Continuity is
perhaps the most restrictive assumption, since it rules out games in which “the
winner takes all”.8 However, as shown in Figure 2(a), it is easy to ﬁnd an almost-
winner-takes-all type of function that satisﬁes A1, for which the winning party is
able to implement a policy arbitrarily close to its electoral platform if it obtains a
plurality larger than ￿. Our setting also allows for ”obstinate” candidates (who will
implement a policy arbitrarily close to their proposal even with a narrow margin of
victory) as well as for very ”reconciling” parties running in the same election (see
Figure 2(b) for an example of such an asymmetric implemented function).9
7The implemented policy function is equivalent to the legislative outcome function in Austen-
Smith (1989), the implemented policy function in Ortu˜ no-Ort´ ın (1997), the outcome function in
Gerber and Ortu˜ no-Ort´ ın (1998), or the policy outcome function in De Sinopoli and Iannantuoni
(2003).
8Continuity could be relaxed by introducing a discontinuity at voting outcome ν = 1
2 without
aﬀecting the predictions of the model, except perhaps for equilibrium existence. Observe, however,
that monotonicity, A1(c), is critical: a larger share of the vote needs to translate into a more
favorable implemented policy, excluding hence pure “winner-takes-all” systems.
9For the shake of presentation we have depicted all implemented policy functions going through
the mid-point between tL and tR, although this is not required by assumption 1.
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(a) The “almost” winner-takes-all func-
tion: the party with more than (50 + ￿)%
of the votes implements a policy arbitrarily
close to its electoral platform.
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(b) A non-symmetric function: control-
ling for the share of the vote received,
party L is more sensitive to the electoral
outcome than party R.
Figure 2: Examples of implemented policy functions. Given, tL and tR, the func-
tion ˆ t assigns to the share of votes received by party L the policy ﬁnally
adopted. Assumption 1 allows for (a) almost discontinuous functions and
(b) non-symmetric functions.
2.2 Voting
There is a continuum of citizens. Each citizen has preferences over policies repre-
sented by the concave utility function u : T → R, where u(t;τ) represents the utility
that a citizen of type τ obtains when t is implemented. Citizens diﬀer then with
respect to their ideal policy. Let F : R → [0,1] describe the distribution of citizens.
We assume F to be continuous and with a density function f.
Citizens observe the platforms announced by the parties, tL and tR, and antic-
ipate the policy-making process (i.e. they know the implemented policy function
ˆ t and have expectations regarding the support that each party will receive.) With
this information, each citizen decides between voting for L, voting for R, or abstain-
ing. Let S = {L,R,A} be the set of actions for a particular citizen, with typical
element s: s = L and s = R denote that the citizen votes for party L and party R,
respectively; s = A denotes abstention.
Insofar a voter cares about the policy outcome, she will choose to vote for a
party based on the eﬀect that greater support for that party has on the implemented
policy. Because the implemented policy is a function of the electoral platforms and
the allocation of votes, it is convenient to represent preferences as a function on
platforms and electoral outcomes:





7Thus, citizen τ’s payoﬀ from voting for L will be the utility change implied by a
larger support for party L. More precisely, for each pair of policies (tL,tR) and
an expected voting outcome ν, τ’s beneﬁt from voting for L will be the partial
derivative of τ’s utility over policies with respect to a change in the fraction of the
vote received by party L. Observe that, because the fraction of voters for R is 1−ν,
an increase in the support for R is equivalent to a decrease in the support for L.
Finally, if a citizen abstains, her utility is equal to zero. Consequently, we deﬁne






∂ν if s = L
−
∂ˆ u(tL,tR,ν;τ)
∂ν if s = R
0 if s = A
(2.3)
As argued in the introduction, individuals may also care about the platform of
the party they support with their vote. We will take that, independent from the
eﬀect on the implemented policy, a voter faces a ‘cost’ from voting for a platform
that diﬀers from her ideal policy. Let η (tL;τ) represent the cost that voter τ faces
from voting for party L when this party defends platform tL. Similarly, let η (tR;τ)
be her cost from voting for party R. Finally, normalize the cost of abstention to
zero. Hence we can deﬁne the cost of voting as11




η (tL;τ) if s = L
η (tR;τ) if s = R
0 if s = A
(2.4)
It follows that a citizen will abstain whenever the cost of voting for her favorite
party is higher than the corresponding beneﬁt she obtains. On the other hand, if she
decides to votes, she will support the party that yields the highest voting utility
deﬁned as:
v (s;tL,tR,ν,τ) = w(s;tL,tR,ν,τ) − ˆ η (s;tL,tR,τ). (2.5)
Thus, given tL, tR and ν, we can partition the electorate into those citizens who
10This utility of voting is similar in spirit to Alesina and Rosenthal’s (1995) conditional sincerity
voting: voters vote with conditional sincerity if they vote “for the party whose legislative vote they
would like to see increased” (p.50). Alternatively, the beneﬁt of voting can also be justiﬁed as a
limiting argument. Appendix A considers a society with a ﬁnite number of citizens n, and derives
the beneﬁt of voting as n goes to inﬁnity, obtaining expression 2.3.
11Observe that this presentation would allow for a constant cost of votign by setting η(t;τ) = k
for all t,τ ∈ T. Further, letting k < 0 could represent a beneﬁt of voting or a cost of abstention,
in line with the “civil duty” arguments.
8vote for L, those who vote for R, and those who abstain according to
L(tL,tR,ν) = {τ ∈ T : v (L;tL,tR,ν,τ) ≥ max{0,v (R;tL,tR,ν,τ)}},
R(tL,tR,ν) = {τ ∈ T : v (R;tL,tR,ν,τ) > max{0,v (L;tL,tR,ν,τ)}},
A(tL,tR,ν) = {τ ∈ T : max{v (L;tL,tR,ν,τ),v (R;tL,tR,ν,τ)} < 0}.
Let VJ (tL,tR,ν) =
R
J(tL,tR,ν) dF be the fraction of the citizenry who votes for
party J. Hence, VL + VR represents the turnout rate and a fraction 1 − VL − VR of
the citizenry abstains.
We have described how citizens vote (or abstain) as a function of the electoral
platforms and the expected support for each party. However, our goal is to ﬁnd
a correspondence that assigns to each pair of platforms the set of all consistent or
rational-expectations voting outcomes, according to the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2.2 We say that ν is a consistent vote for the pair of electoral plat-
forms tL,tR in T if
VL (tL,tR,ν)
VL (tL,tR,ν) + VR (tL,tR,ν)
= ν, (2.6)
that is, if the allocation of votes implied when ν is expected gives rise to a fraction
of votes for L equal to ν.
Thus, we can deﬁne the voting outcome correspondence χ : T 2 ⇒ 2[0,1] as,
χ(tL,tR) = {ν ∈ [0,1] : ν is a consistent vote for (tL,tR)}.
Perhaps abusing language, and without further speciﬁcations, this deﬁnition
admits the possibility that χ(tL,tR) = ∅ for some tL and tR. However, in what
follows, we will restrict the analysis to environments where χ(tL,tR) 6= ∅, ∀(tL,tR).
2.3 Political Equilibrium
Parties are the actual players of the political game, each having single-peaked pref-
erences over policies represented by the utility function πJ : T → R, J = L,R.12
Let τJ = argmax{πJ(t) : t ∈ T} be the ideal policy of party J.13 Without loss of
generality, assume that τL < τR.
12Formally, given that T is compact, single-peakedness of preferences is equivalent to the strict
quasi-concavity of the utility function (Roemer, 2001, p.18).
13Observe that the preferences of a party do not need to coincide with those of a particular
voter, even if they share the same ideal point. Also, it is worth emphasizing that we do not need
to assume that voters know parties’ preferences or ideal policies.
9It is convenient to write the utility of a party as a function of the platforms and
the vote allocation using the deﬁnition of the implemented policy function. Deﬁne
ˆ πJ : T 2 × [0,1] → R as





For illustrative purposes, assume there exists a unique consistent voting out-
come for each pair of policies, (that is, χ is a function). We can then write
˜ πJ (tL,tR) = ˆ πJ (tL,tR,χ(tL,tR)) and a political equilibrium is simply a Nash equi-
librium of the two-party game where parties choose platforms in T to maximize
payoﬀs ˜ πJ. In general, however, χ may not be single-valued and non-empty for all
pairs of policies. Therefore we introduce the following more general deﬁnition of a
political equilibrium:
Deﬁnition 2.3 We say that (tL,tR, ¯ ν) is a political equilibrium if
(i) ¯ ν ∈ χ(tL,tR),
(ii) ˆ πL (tL,tR, ¯ ν) ≥ ˆ πL (t,tR,ν) ∀t ∈ T and ∀ν ∈ χ(t,tR), and
(iii) ˆ πR (tL,tR, ¯ ν) ≥ ˆ πR (tL,t,ν) ∀t ∈ T and ∀ν ∈ χ(tL,t).
That is, in equilibrium, there is no possible voting outcome for which a party can
increase its payoﬀ by announcing a diﬀerent platform. Therefore, the deﬁnition
represents situations where no party has an incentive to deviate from its equilibrium
strategy.
3 Example
Before presenting the formal analysis, we anticipate the main results with an illus-
trative example.
Consider a political process where two ideological parties, L and R, compete
over a single issue. Let T = [0,1] represent the policy space. The weight-of-votes
function g takes the following form (see Figure 3):
g (ν) =
1 − cos(π ν)
2
. (3.1)
Because g is concave for ν > 1
2 and convex for ν < 1
2, winning the election makes a
diﬀerence: the votes received by the government weight more in the policy-setting
process than those received by the opposition.


















Figure 4: Family of Triangular Density Functions.
Let the electorate be distributed according to a triangular distribution with mode
m (see Figure 4 for a few members of this family of density functions). Voters’






The beneﬁt of voting is given by
w(L;tL,tR,ν,τ) =
￿










Voting costs represent the “dis-utility” of supporting a platform far from one’s
ideal policy. In particular,
η (t;τ) = 2|t − τ|.
11Thus, the utility of voting of a citizen τ is
v (L;tL,tR,ν,τ) =
￿
ˆ t(tL,tR,ν) − τ
￿
g
0(ν)(tR − tL) − 2|tL − τ|,
v (R;tL,tR,ν,τ) =
￿
τ − ˆ t(tL,tR,ν)
￿
g
0(ν)(tR − tL) − 2|tR − τ|,
v (A;tL,tR,ν,τ) = 0.






We take the ideal policy of the left party to be τL = 0.2 and that of the right party
to be τR = 0.75.
It is easy to show that, given (tL,tR,ν), voting occurs on two intervals around
the electoral platforms: [λ1,λ2] 3 tL and [ρ1,ρ2] 3 tR.14 Hence,
VL (tL,tR,ν) = F (λ2) − F (λ1),
VR (tL,tR,ν) = F (ρ2) − F (ρ1).
We study two cases: (a) a symmetrically distributed electorate (i.e. m = 1
2),
and (b) a right-skewed distribution (m = 0.7). Figure 5, where we have represented
the political equilibrium for each case, summarizes the main ﬁndings of the paper.
(i) Parties announce diﬀerentiated, non-extreme platforms. In the sym-
metric case, they locate symmetrically with respect to the mean. In the non-
symmetric case, they respond to the right-skewness of the distribution of the
electorate and shift their platforms to the right. Platforms may be more mod-
erate (τL = 0.2 < t∗
L = 0.28) or more radical (τR = 0.75 < t∗
R = 0.8) than
parties’ ideal policies.
(ii) The equilibrium policy does not coincide generically with the ideal
policy of the median voter, except when the electorate is symmetrically
distributed. Observe that the implemented policy also responds in the right
direction to the skewness of the population.
14Of course, λ1, λ2, ρ1, and ρ2 are functions of tL, tR, and ν. In particular, for tL < tR,
λ2 = αˆ t + (1 − α)tL; λ1 = max
￿
β ˆ t + (1 − β)tL,0
￿
;
ρ1 = αˆ t + (1 − α)tR; ρ2 = min
￿









g0(χ(tL,tR))(tR−tL)−2, and ˆ t = g (ν)tL + (1 − g (ν))tR.
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(b) Right-skewed distribution of the electorate.
Figure 5: Typical Equilibria for Symmetric and Asymmetric Distributions of the
Electorate.
(iii) One party wins. Parties may receive diﬀerent shares of the vote cast. Due
to the shift to the right of the electorate in the asymmetric case, the right
party obtains 55% of the votes and wins the election. The left party gets 45%
of the vote and becomes the opposition. Since losers do not disappear after
the elections, party L still have a reason to participate in the election. This is
in contrast with all dominant models, with or without uncertainty, that need
a positive probability of winning for a party to enter the elections.15
(iv) Substantial turnout rates obtain despite the positive voting cost.
Observe that all voters bear a cost of voting from supporting a party via a
platform far form their ideal policy. Nevertheless, turnout rates are “high”
(around 37% and 40%, respectively).
(v) Voters locate in “bands” around the parties’ platforms. That is, each
15Naturally, in the symmetric case both parties receive 50% of the vote.
13party ﬁnds its constituency among those who have a similar ideal policies.
(vi) Abstention results from alienation and from indiﬀerence. Because
preferences are concave, citizens with extreme views beneﬁt the most from
shifts in the implemented policy. However, their preferred party’s platform is
so far from their ideal policy that they decide not to vote. Hence they abstain
due to alienation (i.e. large costs of voting). On the other hand, voters close to
the implemented policy are basically indiﬀerent to small changes in the policy.
They abstain due to small beneﬁts of voting. Observe that if we removed
alienation by letting all citizens face the same constant cost of voting, extreme
voters would vote while moderates may abstain.
4 Costless Voting
In this section, we assume voting is costless. One could think of this restricted
version of the general model as a comparative statics exercise: we recreate the stan-
dard political competition model with certainty, substituting the implemented policy
function for the winner-takes-all assumption. That is, in our model the opposition
party does not disappear from the analysis after the election. Thus, by maintaining
the other basic assumptions (including certainty about voting behavior), we can
understand the eﬀects of giving a role to the opposition in explaining parties’ and
voters’ behavior. The “exercise” becomes even more interesting when we discover
that perturbing the winner-takes-all assumption produces diametrical results: full
divergence of platforms and incentives for all citizens to vote.16 This is in contrast
with the winner-takes-all case where platforms fully converge and no citizen has an
incentive to vote because both parties announce the same platform and hence no
vote is pivotal.
For the rest of this section we assume no costs of voting.17
Assumption 2 (A2) For any τ, η (t;τ) = 0 for all t ∈ T.
The main conclusions of this section are collected in Theorem 4.1: (i) the equi-
librium is unique and (ii) there are only two types of equilibria in which either one
party manages to implement its ideal policy, or, more interestingly, parties radicalize
and announce extreme platforms.
Lemma 4.1 Let A1 and A2 hold. Then:
16To be precise, except for a zero-measure set of voters with ideal policy equal to the implemented
policy, the rest of the electorate prefers voting to abstaining.
17Alternatively, we could allow for a ‘civil duty’ beneﬁt and assume a positive reward from voting
(η(t;τ) = k < 0) without altering the results.
14(i) Given tL,tR ∈ T and ν ∈ [0,1], everybody votes.
Moreover, for tL < tR, everybody to the left of ˆ t(tL,tR,ν) votes for L while
everybody to the right of ˆ t(tL,tR,ν) votes for R.
That is, L(tL,tR,ν) = [t,ˆ t(tL,tR,ν)), and R(tL,tR,ν) = (ˆ t(tL,tR,ν),t].
(ii) χ(tL,tR) is non-empty and single-valued for all (tL,tR) ∈ T 2.
(iii) χ is continuous, except possibly at tL = tR.
The proofs of the lemmas are relegated to Appendix B.
Lemma 4.1 shows that voters vote for the party that represent their interests: every-
body with an ideal policy to the left of the expected implemented policy votes for
the Left party, while those citizens with a preferred policy to the right of the im-
plemented policy vote for the Right party. Hence everybody votes. Moreover, there
exist a unique consistent vote for each pair of platforms and the voting outcome
function is continuous. Because χ is a function, we can project the political game
on the policy space. Thus we are able to formulate the implemented policy and the
utility functions of parties in reduced form. Let ˜ t : T 2 → T be deﬁned by
˜ t(tL,tR) = ˆ t(tL,tR,χ(tL,tR)). (4.1)
For J = L,R, let ˜ πJ : T × T → R be deﬁned by





It follows (Lemma 4.2) that the implemented policy function and the utility of
parties are also continuous on T × T.
Lemma 4.2 The functions ˜ t and ˜ πJ are continuous on T 2.
Deﬁne the best-response correspondence of party J = L,R, BRJ : T ⇒ T,
that assigns to each alternative the set of utility maximizers. That is,
BRL (tR) = argmax{˜ πL (t,tR) | t ∈ T}
BRR (tL) = argmax{˜ πR (tL,t) | t ∈ T}.
The following lemma shows that the best response for each party is to radicalize,
unless it can ensure the implementation of its ideal policy.
Lemma 4.3 Let A1 and A2 hold.
(i) The best-response correspondence of party J, BRJ, is single-valued and con-
tinuous, J = L,R.
15(ii) Given tR ≥ τL, either L can implement its ideal policy, or its best response is
t. That is, either there exists to
L such that ˜ t(to
L,tR) = τL, or BRL (tR) = {t}.
(iii) Given tL ≤ τR, either R can implement its ideal policy, or its best response is
t. That is, either there exists to
R such that ˜ t(tL,to





It follows from the previous lemmas that there is a unique political equilibrium
which can take only two possible forms: either one party implements its ideal policy
or parties radicalize by announcing extreme platforms.
Theorem 4.1 Let A1 and A2 hold. Then:
(i) a political equilibrium exists;
(ii) the equilibrium is unique; and







or one of the parties can implement its ideal policy (i.e. ˜ t(t∗
L,t∗
R) = τJ, for
some J = L,R.)
Proof.
(i) Existence. Let BR : T 2 → T 2 deﬁned by BR(tL,tR) = (BRL (tR),BRR (tL)).
From Lemma 4.3, BR is a continuous function. Thus, by Brouwer’s ﬁxed point
theorem, there exists (t∗
L,t∗




R). It follows that
(t∗
L,t∗
R) is an equilibrium.
(iii) Let (t∗
L,t∗
R) be an equilibrium and suppose that (t∗
L,t∗




R) = τL (Lemma 4.3). If t∗
L = t, then t∗
R 6= ¯ t and ˜ t(t∗
L,t∗
R) = τR (Lemma
4.3, once more).




R) are two diﬀerent equilibria.
From (iii), at least one of them is not (t,¯ t) and it implements the ideal policy
of one party. Without loss of generality, take (t1
L,t1
R) 6= (t,¯ t), and suppose that
˜ t(t1
L,t1
R) = τL (nothing would change had we taken τR instead).
Because τL is implemented, BRR (t1
L) = ¯ t (Lemma 4.3). That is, (t1
L,¯ t) is an
equilibrium and, therefore, t1
L = BRL (¯ t). It follows that (t2
L,t2
R) 6= (t,¯ t) as well,
since BRL is a function and (t2
L,t2
R) 6= (t1




L = t, by a similar reasoning as above.
Therefore, we have shown that ˜ t(t1
L,t1
R) = τL, ˜ t(t2
L,t2
R) = τR, t1
R = ¯ t and t2
L = t.
¿From Lemma 4.1, χ(t1
L,t1
R) = F (τL) and χ(t2
L,t2
R) = F (τR). Then, using the
deﬁnition of ˜ t,






= g (F (τL))t
1
L + (1 − g (F (τL)))¯ t, and





















τR − g (F (τR))t
1 − g (F (τR))
≤ ¯ t.
Rearranging terms, we obtain
τL ≥ g (F (τL))t + (1 − g (F (τL)))¯ t,
τR ≤ g (F (τR))t + (1 − g (F (τR)))¯ t.
But the right hand side of the ﬁrst inequality is larger than the right hand side of
the second inequality (since g is a non-decreasing function) contradicting τL < τR.
￿
Thus, in a very general setting, the standard convergence tendency of platforms
disappears whenever the opposition party interferes in policymaking. Therefore,
platform convergence cannot be explained as the result of party competition, but as
a consequence of excluding the opposition from any post-electoral process. That is,
parties converge in their platforms because they disappear if they lose the election.
5 Political Equilibrium with Costly Voting
In the previous section we showed that if the opposition does not disappear after
the election, parties polarize their positions.18 Recall that an almost winner-takes-
all implemented policy function, like the one in Figure 2(a), would suﬃce to make
parties announce radical platforms.
As argued in the introduction, we cannot ignore that platforms and policies will
not generically coincide and hence that voters may consider both when deciding
whether to vote and for whom. Therefore, we incorporate a cost that depends
on the positions defended by the parties. Despite this cost, a sizable share of the
electorate will still vote. We show that parties do not radicalize their platforms
anymore, although a tendency towards divergence is still present. The intuition is
simple. Voters care about the platform they support, and may feel alienated by a
party that locates itself too far from their ideal policy. If the electorate concentrates
in the middle (i.e., if it holds fairly moderated views), a party will alienate the core
of its constituency by announcing an extreme platform. That is, it is not that the
18This centrifugal force over parties’ platforms distinguishes our results from other explanations
of platform diﬀerentiation, where platforms are subject to a centripetal force but they do not fully
converge.
17divergence tendency does disappear when we consider costly voting, instead it ﬁnds
an opposing force that diminishes its eﬀect.
Thus, voters will consider the electoral platforms when casting their votes (or
abstaining). In this sense voting is costly. Let the cost of voting be an increasing
and weakly convex function of the distance between the platform of the party and
the preferred policy of the voter:
η (t;τ) = ζ (|t − τ|), with ζ
0 > 0, ζ
00 ≥ 0, and ζ(0) = 0. (5.1)
We shall assume through this section that policy formation follows a proportional
representation system (as deﬁned in Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Lizzeri and Persico,
2001; Gerber and Ortu˜ no-Ort´ ın, 1998; Ortu˜ no-Ort´ ın, 1997), namely ˆ t(tL,tR,ν) =
ν tL + (1 − ν)tR, for all (tL,tR,ν).19 Let the policy space be the unit interval,
T = [0,1]. In addition, we shall assume that the beneﬁt of voting for a party is a
weakly concave function of τ. That is,
∂2w(L,τ)
∂τ2 ≤ 0.20 In other words, since voters
further from the implemented policy are more sensitive to changes in the policy (this
follows directly from the concavity of the utility function), we shall assume that this
sensitivity increases at a decreasing rate.21
A ﬁrst result shows each party’s constituency is concentrated in an interval
around the platform.
Theorem 5.1 Given tL,tR, and ν, with tL 6= tR and ν ∈ (0,1), the voters of party
L concentrate in an interval around tL, while the voters of party R concentrate in
an interval around tR. That is,
L(tL,tR,ν) = [λ1 (tL,tR,ν),λ2 (tL,tR,ν)] 3 tL, and
R(tL,tR,ν) = [ρ1 (tL,tR,ν),ρ2 (tL,tR,ν)] 3 tR.
Proof. Take tL,tR ∈ T and ν ∈ (0,1). Let tL < tR (the proof can be easily
replicated for tL > tR). Write ˜ w(s;τ) = w(s;tL,tR,ν,τ), ˜ η (s;τ) = ˆ η (s;tL,tR,τ),
˜ v (s;τ) = ˜ w(s;τ) − ˜ η (s;τ), and t∗ = ˆ t(tL,tR,ν).
19Proportional representation is taken for the sake of presentation. For instance, section 3 does
present an example with a non-proportional weight function.
20For instance, any concave utility as a function of the distance between the policy and the ideal
point of the agent would satisfy this condition.
21As it will become evident through the analysis, the weakly concavity of the beneﬁt of voting
is equivalent to the single-crossing property, commonly used in voting models, since it implies that
voters for each party form a connected set.
The need for these speciﬁcations derives from the fact the possibility of abstention engenders
equilibrium existence problems even in the standard winner-takes-all system (Llavador, 2000).
Although it could be relaxed in many ways without aﬀecting the results, we choose the current
speciﬁcation for the shake of simplicity.
18First, from Lemma 4.1, a citizen to the left(right) of t∗ either votes for party
L(party R) or abstain. Second, observe that v(L,t∗) < 0 (since w(L,t∗) = 0 <
η(tL,t∗)), while v(L,tL) > 0 (w(L,tL) > 0 = η(tL,tL)). Finally, because w is
concave in τ, η is convex in τ and v = w − v, it follows that v is concave in τ.
Thus, the upper-contour sets of v are convex sets. In particular, VL(tL,tR,ν) =
τ ∈ [0,1] : v(L,τ) ≥ 0 is a convex set which contains tL (v(L,tL) > 0).
A similar argument applies for VR. ￿
Furthermore, there is always a positive mass of citizens who decide to vote:
Corollary 5.1 For any tL,tR, and ν with tL 6= tR, there exists always a positive
mass of citizens who vote. That is,
VL(tL,tR,ν) + VR(tL,tR,ν) > 0 ∀(tL,tR,ν) with tL 6= tR. (5.2)
Proof. If 0 < ν < 1, it follows directly from Theorem 5.1. If ν = 0 then
VL > 0 (since t∗ > tL), while if ν = 1, VR > 0 (t∗ < tR). ￿
The following technical lemmas are used for the existence and characterization
of equilibria. First, we show that the share of the vote cast for a party is a contin-
uous, monotone function. It will follow that there exists a unique consistent voting
outcome associated to each pair of platforms.
Lemma 5.1 Let tL 6= tR. Then VL and VR are continuous functions, VL is non-
increasing in ν, and VR is non-decreasing in ν.
Lemma 5.2 The consistent voting outcome correspondence χ is non-empty, single-
valued, and continuous for all tL 6= tR.
When both parties propose identical platforms, the implemented policy is un-
mistakably the common platform, independent of the voting outcome. Therefore,
using Lemma 5.2 we can write the implemented policy as:
˜ t(tL,tR) =
(
ˆ t(tL,tR,χ(tL,tR)) if tL 6= tR,
t if tL = tR = t.
Consider ﬁrst a symmetrically distributed electorate. Not surprisingly, equilibria
present symmetry features: parties propose symmetric policies, the vote is equally
split, and the implemented policy is the median policy, which, in this case, coincides
with the mean. More importantly, while parties propose diﬀerentiated platforms,
they do not (necessarily) take extreme positions.22 For instance, a suﬃciently high
voting cost and a fairly concentrated distribution of the electorate would drive par-
ties to moderate their proposals.
22We might argue that symmetry should facilitate location at the extremes. Therefore, ﬁnding
non-extreme platforms for symmetrically distributed populations strengthen our argument.
19Theorem 5.2 Let the electorate be distributed symmetrically around 1
2: f(x) =
f(1 − x). If τL ≤ 1
2 ≤ τR and τL 6= τR, then:




2 − k and t∗
R = 1
2 + k
for some k ∈ [0,1/2);
(ii) at any equilibria, the implemented policy is t∗ = 1
2, and both parties receive the
same share of votes, ν∗ = 1
2.
Proof. We proceed in steps.
• First we construct an auxiliary zero-sum game and show that there always
exists an equilibrium for this game.
Consider the game Γ = (2,T,ΠL,ΠR), where the payoﬀs of the parties are
ΠL (tL,tR) = −˜ t(tL,tR) and ΠR (tL,tR) = ˜ t(tL,tR), respectively. This is a















Because party R can surely implement at least ˜ to
R and party L can keep the
policy from being more than ˜ to
L, then it must be that ˜ t0
R ≤ ˜ t0
L. On the other
hand, a party can always impose a policy t∗ = 1
2 by announcing a symmetric
platform to its opponent’s. It follows that ˜ t0
L ≤ 1




L = ˜ t0
R = 1
2. Thus, an equilibrium of Γ exits and the implemented policy is 1
2.
• Secondly, we show that if (t∗
L,t∗





R,ν∗) is a political equilibrium, proving point (i) of the theorem.
Because (t∗
L,t∗
R) is an equilibrium of Φ, ˜ t(t∗
L,t) ≤ ˜ t(t∗
L,t∗
R) ≤ ˜ t(t,t∗
R) for all t,
i.e., party L cannot lower the implemented policy, neither can party R increase
it. Recall that τL < 1
2 = ˜ t(t∗
L,t∗
R) an πL is single-peaked, it follows then that
t∗
L is a best response for L to t∗
R. Viceversa t∗




R,ν∗) is a political equilibrium.
• Finally, observe that party R will never propose a policy tR < τL, for it is a
strictly dominated strategy. Similarly, party L will never propose tL > τR.
Thus, after eliminating strictly dominated strategies, the political game is a
strictly competitive game, and hence all equilibria yield the same payoﬀs for
the parties: t∗ = 1
2.
￿














(b) χ is not quasi-concave









(c) An equilibrium does not
exist: the reaction curves do
not intersect.
Figure 6: Example of non-existence of equilibrium for very asymmetric distribu-
tions. The density function is bi-triangular and η (t;τ) = −5|t − τ|.
The results found under symmetry extend to more general distributions of the
electorate. However, for highly asymmetric distributions (mainly displaying more
than one peak), one may construct examples where an equilibrium in pure strategies
fails to exist23. Figure 6 illustrates such a case24 (details available from the author.)
However, these examples are not common and involve very strong asymmetries. We
choose to postulate a suﬃcient condition for the existence of equilibria. In particular,
we take χ to be log-concave, a premise also known in the literature as decreasing
hazard rate.25 Figure 6(b) shows that this condition is violated in the non-existence
example.
Theorem 5.3 Let χ be log-concave in tL and let 1−χ be log-concave in tR. Then:
(i) a political equilibrium exists,
(ii) at the equilibrium parties propose diﬀerentiated but not necessarily extreme
policies, and
(iii) the implemented policy is the same in all equilibria.
Proof. We follow the steps of the symmetric case.
23However, there exits always an equilibrium in mixed strategies (see Fudenberg and Tirole
(Theorem 1.3 in 1991).)
24As mentioned before, equilibrium existence is also an issue in the classic winner-takes-all model
with abstention and multi-peaked distributions of the electorate (Llavador, 2000).
25Ideally, such assumptions would be imposed on the primitives of the model (g, F, u, and η),
but because χ is implicitly derived from a complex computation, this is not an easy task. Instead,
we follow (Roemer, 1997, p.492) who, in a similar context, also requires the log-concavity of a
compound function.
21• First, we construct a zero-sum game Γ and prove that an equilibrium always
exists in this game.
Consider the two-party, zero-sum game Γ = (T,ΠL,ΠR), with payoﬀ func-
tions ΠL (tL,tR) = −ˆ t(tL,tR,χ(tL,tR)) and ΠR (tL,tR) = ˆ t(tL,tR,χ(tL,tR)),
respectively. Use the implemented policy function to write:
ΠL (tL,tR) = −tR + χ(tL,tR)(tR − tL), and
ΠR (tL,tR) = tL + (1 − χ(tL,tR))(tR − tL).
Therefore, maximizing ΠL (with respect to tL) and ΠR (with respect to tR) is
equivalent to maximizing
κL (tL,tR) ≡ χ(tL,tR)(tR − tL) and
κR (tL,tR) ≡ (1 − χ(tL,tR))(tR − tL).
Next we show that the log-concavity of χ implies the quasi-concavity of κL.
The function κL is quasi-concave in tL if
∂2κL
∂t2
L (tL,tR) ≤ 0 for all tL such that
∂κL
∂tL (tL,tR) = 0. Write χL =
∂χ










(tL,tR) = χLL (tL,tR) · (tR − tL) − 2 · χL (tL,tR). (5.4)
Let tL ∈ T such that
∂κL
∂tL = 0, then from (5.3) we get (tR − tL) =
χ(tL,tR)
χL(tL,tR)





















￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ∂κL
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≥ 0 ⇔ χLL|∂κL
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The log-concavity of χ implies that χLL · χ − (χL)
2 ≤ 0. It follows from (5.5)
that κL is quasi-concave. A symmetric argument shows that the log-concavity
of (1 − χ) implies that κR is quasi-concave in tR.
22Let BRL (tR) be the set of maximizers of ΠL (tL,tR) for a given tR (i.e., the best
response of L to tR). Since κL is quasi-concave, BRL is convex-valued. From
the Theorem of the Maximum, BRL is non-empty and upper hemi-continuous.
Similarly, BRR is also non-empty, convex-valued and upper hemi-continuous.
Then, the correspondence BR : T 2 → T 2:BR(tL,tR) = (BRL (tR),BRR (tL))
is non-empty, convex-valued and upper hemi-continuous. By Kakutani’s ﬁxed








• Secondly, let (t∗
L,t∗
R) be an equilibrium of the zero-sum game Γ and let t∗ =
˜ t(t∗
L,t∗
R) be the equilibrium policy. If t∗ locates between the ideal policies of
the parties (τL < t∗ < τR), then these policies constitute an equilibrium of the
political game.
If τL ≤ t∗ ≤ τR, then neither party can pull the implemented policy towards its
ideal point given the platform announced by the other party. Hence, (t∗
L,t∗
R)
is a political equilibrium.
• Thirdly, if t∗ is more extreme than a party’s bliss point (t∗ < τL or t∗ > τR),
then there exists a political equilibrium where that party is able to implement
its ideal policy.
Take, for example, t∗ < τL. Since Γ is a zero-sum game, it follows that L can
secure a policy as to the left as t∗. Because τL > t∗, t∗ represents a lower
payoﬀ for L in the zero-sum game, and party L can deﬁnitely secure τL. Thus,
if t∗ < τL, there exists a political equilibrium where the implemented policy
is τL. Similarly, if t∗ > τR, there exists a political equilibrium with τR as the
implemented policy.
• It follows from the previous two points that an equilibrium of the political
game always exists. Part (i) is proved.
• Party R will never propose a policy tR < τL, nor party L will ever propose tL >
τR. Thus, after eliminating these strictly dominated strategies, the political
game is a strictly competitive game and hence the implemented policy is the
same in all equilibria, proving part (iii)
• Finally, we prove part (ii). Observe that one can never have an equilibrium
where both parties propose the same policy. At least one party can always
pull the policy a bit closer to its ideal point by diﬀerentiating its platform and
capturing a small fraction of the vote. As the example in Section 3 shows,
platforms may not be extreme at equilibrium.
￿
23Summarizing, we provide suﬃcient conditions for equilibrium existence. At equi-
librium, voters concentrate around the platforms of the parties and, despite positive
voting costs, high turnout rates obtain. Abstention occurs among both citizens with
extreme and moderate views and can be explained in terms of alienation and indif-
ference. Parties announce diﬀerentiated but non-radical platforms, still they may
choose platforms that are more extreme than their ideal policy. The implemented
policy tends to be moderated and unrelated to the ideal policy of the median voter.
Thus our results are consistent with the observation of polarized platforms and
moderate policies.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper enriches the theoretical framework of political competition to allow for
non-trivial policy-setting processes and for sophisticated voters. We let the imple-
mented policy depend on the electoral platforms and the margin of victory. Voters
may vote for one of the candidates or abstain. Since platforms and implemented
policies may diﬀer, voting for the preferred candidate is not always a dominant strat-
egy. Thus, we cannot ignore that voters may consider both the electoral platform
and the eﬀect on the implemented policy when deciding whether to vote and for
whom.
First, we show that in the predominant framework of costless voting, a divergence
tendency drives parties to take extreme positions. This centrifugal force diﬀerenti-
ates our results from other explanations of party diﬀerentiation. The key assumption
driving our explanation is that the opposition party does not disappear from the
political arena after loosing the election. Rather, its platform and electoral support
aﬀect (to some extent) the implemented policy. Considering rational voters allows
us to prove equilibrium existence for a generic speciﬁcation of the implemented
function and any distribution of the electorate.
Secondly, we introduce costly voting (voters care about supporting a party too
alien to their political preferences). We provide suﬃcient conditions for equilibrium
existence and show that equilibria are characterized by diﬀerentiated, yet not neces-
sarily radical, platforms.26 Here, it is the risk of alienating one’s core constituency
what drives partial convergence in parties’ platforms. High turnout rates obtain,
even with positive costs of voting. Abstention occurs among voters with extreme
as well as moderate views. The implemented policy tends to be moderated and
unrelated to the ideal policy of the median voter. Thus our results are consistent
with both the observation of polarized platforms and moderate policies, and the
alienation and indiﬀerence causes of abstention.
26Nevertheless, platforms may be more extreme than parties’ ideal policies.
24More importantly, the analysis evidences that the distribution of the electorate,
and not only the (expected) location of a pivotal voter, matters in determining policy
outcomes. Consider, for example, two countries identical on everything but on the
distribution of their electorate. While country A’s electorate follows a concentrated-
in-the-middle, unimodal distribution, the electorate of country B is fractured into
two radical groups (its density function presents two peaks with the majority of the
population located around them). Assume that they share the same median voter,
or, if there is uncertainty, that the knowledge about the location of the median voter
is the same in both countries. According to our model, parties in country A would
move towards the center to avoid alienating the core of their constituency, while
parties in country B will radicalize their positions, following the radicalization of
the electorate.27 However, models based on the median voter are insensitive to the
distribution of the population and would predict the same electoral outcome in both
countries.
Summarizing our results, we should observe parties moving towards the ‘middle’
of the political spectrum when (i) the mass of the electorate is concentrated around
moderate views, and (ii) parties alienate the core of their constituencies if they
radicalize their platforms. This is in contrast to the standard claims that parties
tend to the middle because of competition, and that platforms should converge as
the uncertainty level falls (ceteris paribus). In this sense, our model is consistent
with the observation that electorate polarization and elite political divergence have
moved in tandem for the past half century. It also sheds light on the radicalization
of parties’ positions in those regions, like Israel or the Basque Country, where the
electorate is divided and polarized.
Appendix
A A Limiting Argument for the Beneﬁt of Voting
In this appendix we present a justiﬁcation for the beneﬁt of voting –as described in
expression 2.3– based on the impact of a citizen’s vote on the implemented policy
when the number of voters go to inﬁnity.
First, for a given pair of announced platforms (tL,tR), we write the utility of a voter






27The implemented policy in country B may or may not be radical, depending on the relative
weight of each group and on post-electoral policymaking process (the function g in the model.)
25Consider a society with a ﬁnite number of voters n. Observe that depending on the
value of n, it may not be ‘possible’ to expect an exact ν% of the population voting
for L. Therefore, given a ν ∈ (0,1), we need to deﬁne ν(n). We know we can write
ν =
p
q with p,q ∈ N. (In particular, take p,q such that q is the minimum integer
with ν =
p






where bn · νc gives the largest integer less than or equal to n · ν.28






Observe that ν(n) converges to ν. Thus, any subsequence also converges to ν. Take,
in particular, {nk}
∞
k=1 such that nk = k q. It follows that ν(nk) = ν for all k. Finally,
after a monotone increasing transformation of utility, we let nk go to inﬁnity and
















B Proofs of Lemmata
Lemma 4.1. Let A1 and A2 hold. Then:
(i) Given tL,tR ∈ T and ν ∈ [0,1], everybody votes.
Moreover, for tL < tR, everybody to the left of ˆ t(tL,tR,ν) votes for L while
everybody to the right of ˆ t(tL,tR,ν) votes for R. That is, VL (tL,tR,ν) = ￿
t,ˆ t(tL,tR,ν)
￿





(ii) χ(tL,tR) is non-empty and single-valued for all (tL,tR) ∈ T 2.
(iii) χ is continuous, except possibly at tL = tR.
28The function bxc is known as the ﬂoor function , the greatest integer function or the integer
part function, and gives the largest integer less than or equal to x.
26Proof.
(i) That everybody votes follows directly from the deﬁnition of wτ. Because, for all
(tL,tR,ν) and for all τ, w(L;tL,tR,ν,τ) = −w(R;tL,tR,ν,τ) and w(A;tL,tR,ν,τ) =
0, then either voting for L or voting for R is at least as preferred as abstaining.









0 (ν) · (tL − tR).
Thus, w(L;tL,tR,ν,τ) > 0 if and only if ∂u
∂t (t0;τ) < 0. By single-peakedness,
∂u
∂t (t0;τ) < 0 if and only if τ < t0. Hence, everybody to the left of t0 votes for L
while everybody to the right of t0 votes for R.
(ii) From (i), VL (tL,tR,ν) = F (t0) and VL (tL,tR,ν) + VR (tL,tR,ν) = 1. Thus,
we only need to show that there exists a unique solution to the following equation
in ν:
ν = F (g (ν)tL + (1 − g (ν))tR) if tL ≤ tR,
or ν = 1 − F (g (ν)tL + (1 − g (ν))tR) if tL > tR.
Consider 3 cases:
Case 1: tL < tR. Deﬁne Ψ1 (ν) = F (g (ν)tL + (1 − g (ν))tR)−ν. Note that g ∈ C1
(A1), and F ∈ C1. Then Ψ1 ∈ C1, and
Ψ
0





0 (ν) · (tL − tR) − 1 < 0,
since f ≥ 0, g0 ≥ 0, and (tL − tR) < 0. Thus, Ψ1 is a continuous, strictly decreasing
function. Because Ψ1 (0) = F (tR) > 0 and Ψ1 (1) = F (tL) − 1 < 0, there exists a
unique ν in (0,1) that solves the equation Ψ1 (ν) = 0.
Case 2: tL > tR. Deﬁne Ψ2 (ν) = 1−F (g (ν)tL + (1 − g (ν))tR)−ν. By symmetry
with Case 1, there exists a unique solution ν in (0,1) to the equation Ψ2 (ν) = 0.
Case 3: tL = tR = t. For any ν ∈ [0,1], ˆ t(t,t,ν) = t. Thus χ(t,t) = 1 is the unique
solution we are looking for.
(iii). Let tL < tR. We know from (ii) that Ψ0
1(ν) 6= 0. By the Implicit Function


















Ψ1 (ψˇ t (tL,tR);tL,tR) = 0. (B.1)
Because, from (ii), the solution to “Ψ(ν,tL,tR) = 0” is unique, χ(tL,tR) is a sin-
gleton and, thus, can be viewed as a function. Then, (B.1) implies that χ(tL,tR) =


















ˇ tL < ˇ tR, we conclude that χ is continuous on {(tL,tR) ∈ T 2 : tL < tR}. A similar
argument applies for tL > tR. ￿
Lemma 4.2. The functions ˜ t and ˜ πJ are continuous on T 2.
Proof. Recall that ˜ t(tL,tR) = g (χ(tL,tR))tL+(1 − g (χ(tL,tR)))tR. By
A1, g is a continuous function and, by Lemma 4.1(iii), χ is continuous for tL 6= tR.
Thus, ˜ t is continuous for tL 6= tR.












→ ˆ t(¯ t,¯ t).
































= ¯ t = ˜ t(¯ t,¯ t). It follows that ˜ t is continuous for tL = tR as
well. Hence, ˜ t is continuous on T 2.




is also a continuous function on T 2. ￿
Lemma 4.3. Let A1 and A2 hold.
(i) The best-response correspondence of party J, BRJ, is single-valued and con-
tinuous, J = L,R.
(ii) Given tR ≥ τL, either L can implement its ideal policy, or its best response is
t. That is, either there exists to
L such that ˜ t(to
L,tR) = τL, or BRL (tR) = {t}.
(iii) Given tL ≤ τR, either R can implement its ideal policy, or its best response is
t. That is, either there exists to
R such that ˜ t(tL,to





Proof. (i) We only prove the lemma for party L. The proof for party R
is symmetric.
1. Claim: If t0,t00 ∈ BRL (tR), then ˜ t(t0,tR) = ˜ t(t00,tR). Suppose not, say
˜ t(t0,tR) < ˜ t(t00,tR). By the strict quasi-concavity of πL: ˜ t(t0,tR) < τL <
˜ t(t00,tR). But ˜ t is a continuous function (Lemma 4.2). Thus, there exists a
t000 between t0 and t00 such that ˜ t(t000,tR) = τL, i.e. ˜ πL (t000,tR) = πL (τL) >
˜ πL (t0,tR), contradicting the fact that t0 is a best response.
2. It is easy to see that BRL (τL) = {τL}, since ˜ t(t,τL) 6= τL for all t 6= τL.
3. Let tR > τL and assume that t0 and t00 are best responses for party L to tR,
with t0 6= t00. Assume, without loss of generality, that t0 < t00. Then t00 < tR.
Otherwise party L would be better-oﬀ by choosing tR : τL < ˜ t(tR,tR) = tR <
˜ t(t00,tR).







· (tR − tL) + g (χ(tL,tR)),
28where χ is implicitly deﬁned as the unique solution of F (g (ν)tL + (1 − g (ν))tR)−













g0 (χ(tL,tR))(tR − tL) + 1
,









g0 (χ(tL,tR))(tR − tL) + 1
> 0.
But this implies that ˜ t(t0,tR) < ˜ t(t00,tR), a contradiction with step 1.
4. A similar argument applies to tR < τL. Thus, the best-response correspon-
dence is single-valued.
5. Continuity is a direct implication of the theorem of the maximum.
(ii). If to
L exists, then it is a global maximizer of ˜ πL (t,tR) and clearly the best choice
for party L. If there is no t ∈ T such that ˜ t(t,tR) = τL, then it follows from the
continuity of ˜ t that ˜ t(t,tR) > τL for all t ∈ T (recall that ˜ t(tR,tR) = tR > τL).
Because ˜ t is monotone increasing in tL (see step 3 above) and πL is single-peaked,
it follows that τL < ˜ t(t,tR) < ˜ t(t,tR) for all t > t. Thus, BRL (tR) = t.
(iii). The proof is a symmetric replica of (ii). ￿
Lemma 5.1. Let tL 6= tR. Then VL and VR are continuous functions, VL is non-
increasing in ν, and VR is non-decreasing in ν.
Proof. ¿From Theorem 5.1, party L’s voters concentrate in the interval
L(tL,tR,ν). Hence we can write
VL (tL,tR,ν) = F (λ2 (tL,tR,ν)) − F (λ1 (tL,tR,ν)),
where λ2 is implicitly deﬁned as the unique τ > tL that solves v (L;tL,tR,ν,τ) = 0.







































Figure 7: As ν increases, the support for L decreases.
then
∂λ2
∂ν (tL,tR,ν) < 0 (see Fig 7.) That is, λ2 decreases as ν increases.
If λ1 = 0, it cannot decrease any further. If λ1 > 0, then it is continuous and,











First, the numerator is negative: ∂w










￿ ￿, since w is weakly concave in τ, η is convex in













Similar calculations for VR obtain that VR is non-decreasing in ν. ￿
Lemma 5.2. The consistent voting outcome correspondence χ is non-empty, single-
valued, and continuous for all tL 6= tR.
Proof. Take tL 6= tR. From Lemma 5.1 and Theorem 5.1, VL and VR are
continuous and VL (tL,tR,ν) + VR (tL,tR,ν) > 0. Deﬁne
Ψ(ν;tL,tR) =
VL (tL,tR,ν)
VL (tL,tR,ν) + VR (tL,tR,ν)
− ν
We know that ν ∈ χ(tL,tR) if and only if Ψ(ν;tL,tR) = 0 (see (2.6)), that
Ψ is continuous and decreasing (Lemma 5.1), that Ψ(0;tL,tR) ≥ 0, and that
30Ψ(1;tL,tR) ≤ 0. Thus, there exists a unique ν such that Ψ(ν;tL,tR) = 0. That
is, χ is non-empty and single-valued. Continuity follows directly from the Implicit
Function Theorem. ￿
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